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Robert Coover's Playing Fields Brenda Wineapple 
ROBERT coover's fictions demonstrate how diverse perceptions com 
bine and recombine to create meaning. His work, from the early Origin of the 
Brunists (1966) to the recent The Public Burning (1977), does not employ lan 
guage to refer to a fixed set of meaning behind which lies a central, unifying 
order. Rather, his fictions suggest that meaning resides everywhere and no 
where. It can be located only by a fiction?perhaps the reader's, perhaps the 
narrator's?constructed in language. Of course, even there, new meanings 
accrue as we 
sally into the world of the imagination, a world where interpreta 
tion mounts on interpretation and perceptions can constantly shift. 
Coover plays with the many possibilities and alternatives contained within 
language and narrative structures. At the same time, fictions which open a 
labyrinth of meanings do not therefore imply an absence of ethical strategy 
or even moral vision. The world of experience exists despite our fictions, and 
it is a world to which we must always return, even if it is fundamentally 
incomprehensible. Yet, the imagination gives us our sense of the world, and 
Coover enjoins us to become aware of the various relationships and perspectives 
in constant need of reformulation. To live, we choose whatever fictions best 
sort out our 
perceptions and sensations. Yet, we often and conveniently forget 
that our point of view, itself fictional, implies an element of choice. In our 
forgetfulness, we allow our fictions to overtake our lives: 
. . . We are all 
creating fictions all the time, out of necessity. We constant 
ly test them against the experience of life. Some continue to be functional; 
we are content to let them be rather than try to analyze them and, in the 
process, forget something else that is even more important. Others outlive 
their usefulness. They disturb life in some unnecessary way, and so it 
becomes necessary to break them up and perhaps change their force.1 
Coover intends, therefore, to "tell good stories . . . and tell them well" while 
combating "adolescent thought modes and exhausted art forms 
... 
"2 He 
invokes various forms and genres?the fairy tale in "The Door: A Prologue 
of Sorts," the romance in "The Magic Poker," existential drama in "In a Train 
Station"?to reconstitute their structure. Like Henry Waugh's baseball game 
in The Universal Baseball Association (1968), Coover's fictions begin with the 
acceptance of an embedded structure, even if this structure contains the very 
assumptions he seeks to challenge. 
Thus, the mind engages in a process of discovery to find itself, its fictions, 
and its limits. The narrators in Pricksongs & Descants (1969) seek to illuminate 
reality, not transcend or change it. Reality itself implies change. Therefore, 
many of these stories begin with 
a 
predetermined structure?a situation, a pair 
of symbols (a thin man and a fat lady), a perspective?and explore the latent 
dimensions ofthat structure. The aesthetic design is neither static 
nor transcen 
dent. "But can the end be in the middle? Yes, yes, it always is 
... 
" 
(P & D, 33) 
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Storytelling, then, does not lead to a confrontation with any fixed or singular 
point of view, and it provides 
no 
"message." Rather, it opens the door, to use 
Coover's 
metaphor, onto 
a horizon of possibilities. He therefore charges his 
stories, in Pricksongs & Descants to 
probe beyond the phenomenological, beyond appearances, beyond ran 
domly perceived events, beyond mere history. But these probes are above 





dying age, exemplary adventures 
of the Poetic Imagination, high-minded journeys toward the New World 
and never mind that the nag's a pile of bones. 
(P & D, 78) 
Probing beyond appearances or beyond mere history does not necessarily deny 
the impact of history or appearance on our experience. The brute facts of 
existence?notably death?force us to recognize limits. Thus, the creative 
freedom of apprehension operates within the "confines of cosmic or human 
necessity" (P & D, 78). When Granny, the aged Beauty who married the Beast 
in "The Door: A Prologue o( Sorts," declares that her beast never became a 
prince and that she loves him, all legends aside, anyway, she asserts with 
Coover that in fiction and in spite of it, beasts remain beasts and death remains 
death. Notwithstanding that love, laughter, and the imagination remain. 
Therefore, Coover's world neither ignores monsters, on the one hand, nor 
mystifies them, on the other. The knight in "The Magic Poker" declares that 
"there are no disenchantments, merely progressions and styles of possession. To 
exist is to be spellbound" (P & D, 30); Paul, in "A Pedestrian Accident," must 
confront the inexplicability of his coming death. Yet, despite death, the 
unknown, uncertainty, and the inexplicability of other people, the imagination 
can create with those limits of cosmic or human necessity. 
The combination of imaginative life and mortality makes us recognize that 
we are all born 
"hopelessly sentient creatures into the inexplicable emptiness, 
giving carelessly of... bellies, teats, and strength, then sinking away into 
addled uselessness, humming the old songs, the old lies, and smiling toothless 
enfuriating smiles" (P & D, 14-15). Yet, these very songs, lies, and smiles give 
life another dimension?the dynamism of imagined possibilities. For Coover, 
then, the creative consciousness co-exists with blindness and emptiness. The 
imagination does not transcend the facts of existence?Wilbur Klee, in "Klee 
Dead," will remain dead in spite of his effort?but can enrich modes of 
perception and aid in coming to terms with mortality. 
In this same sketch, the narrator notes that 
... we seem impulsively driven to laden up empty space, to plump some 
goddamn thing, any object, real, imagined, or otherwise, where now there 
might happily be nothing, a peaceful unsullied and unpeopled empti 
ness . . . 
(P & D, 105} 
If the self confronts a possible blank in nature and indeed in the blankness 
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of its own being, such 
a confrontation provokes creative perception. Death is 
final, but the imagination, in its seeking, extends the possibilities of life. Its 
inventions do not rescind mortality but rather discover realms of a "New 
World." 
In "Scene for 'Winter' ", one of the "The Sentient Lens" series o? Pricksongs 
and Descants, for example, the 
narrator and reader, linked by the pronoun "we," 
enter an environment distinguished, 
at first, by the absence of sound. Yet, as 
the ear discovers silence, the eye discovers the complex patterns of trees, 
shadows, and snow in the "quavering stability of light." Light, itself in motion 
and yet a constant, joins perceiver and perceived. Although "we can be sure 
only of the surface" (P & D, 168-169), once we begin to move in this landscape, 
we create the 
"imperceptible violence and motion of shadow" (P & D, 169). 
We perceive the static beauty of the landscape in sounds and images; when we 
hear sounds, a rabbit appears. However, when we see and follow a man?a 
familiar face "much like someone we have seen before"?he becomes our sole 
focus of attention, and yet he remains fundamentally unknowable and impene 
trable. The meaning of his smile and of his laugh evades us. Soon we draw 
away, the man becomes a memory, and we realize he is the rabbit we first 
observed. Again, sound?the sound of a dog eating?preoccupies us before 
sound recedes into silence. 
The mind has contributed its own patterning?the familiar face of a 
man?to a scene in which beauty exists but is static. Imagination enters "the 
virgin planes of groundsnow" (P & D, 169) in which we invent ourselves in 
different forms. At first, and from close range, we saw a sign with the word 
"men" on it, but that sign referred to nothing. "The lamps are not lit: it is 
the bright part of the day" (P & D, 170); the sun, dazzling and constant, can 
reveal only what is not there until the imagination creates itself anew in 
nature. 
Once the imagination begins 
to interact with the environment, a man does 
appear in imaginative fact. Significantly, that man reminds 
us of someone else, 
and memory introduces the notion of temporality. Even if that man is our 
fiction, our participation in time links him to us. The man grows out of the 
interaction between our consciousness and the world. The interaction between 
imagination and environment inspires a dynamism where things metamorpho 
size, and no one thing contains more meaning than anything else for the 
duration of this activity. The imagination gives life to all created possibilities. 
Art provides the space for this transference, and although the creative con 
sciousness plays an important role, it is not authoritative. In the end, the silence 
of winter remains. 
Coover does not, therefore, dispense with the notion of consciousness or 
imagination but rather underscores need for balance. Neither narrator nor 
character, writer nor reader, self nor environment create independently. On 
the other hand, he does not go as far as the French objectivist novel, for 
example, or Donald Barthelme, for another example, in the reduction of the 
self to the level of all other surfaces. Coover's stories present the mind at work, 
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discovering the contiguous relations admidst 
a network of alternatives. In the 
second "Sentient Lens" sketch, "The Milkmaid of Samaniego," the narrator 
and reader again conjoin on a spatial landscape, and this landscape represents 
the field of the story. In it, we notice that 
It's almost as though there has been some sort of unspoken, but well 
understood prologue, no mere epigraph of random design, but a precise 
structure of predetermined images, both basic and prior to us, that de 
scribes her to us before our senses have located her in the present combina 
tion of shapes and colors. 
(P & D, 175) 
We bring certain expectations to the landscape, and we help shape that 
landscape that contains its 
own intractable texture. In "The Leper's Helix," 
the third and last sketch in "The Sentient Lens," narrator, reader, and leper 
interact on a desert, and the three become characters in a dance of life and 
death.3 Our movement differs from the leper's, it seems, but 
once an encoun 
ter occurs, we merge with him and prepare to continue the cyclical movement. 
Seeking to avoid death, we learn to embrace it. 





hedonistic pleasure, in mere action and its power?how we could have 
wasted it all! ? we had forgot what was to come at the end ?had we 
thought only thought, we could have drawn two circles, or ten circles, 
postponed this ultimate experience, could have, but the choice was ours 
just once, our impulsive first action has become?alas!?a given, the 
inexorable governor of all that remains?or has the leper had us all along? 
did his pace allow two circles? and does it matter? for the encounter must 
come, mustn't it? whether after one circle, two circles, or ten. 
(P & D, 181) 
The narrator of "The Magic Poker" asks "where does this illusion come 
from, this sensation and 'hardness' in a blue teakettle or an iron poker, golden 
haunches or a green piano?" (P & D, 34). The story itself answers the question, 
for within it, inventions become "real" once imaginative projections set them 
in motion. Even the narrator becomes an important character in the figuring 
of action. He invents the scenario?"I wander the island, inventing it" (P & 
D, 20)?and yet he also becomes invented by it?"I sometimes wonder if it 
was not he [the caretaker's son] who invented me ... "(P & D, 27). The 
narrator's existence depends on his invention: without the story, there would 
be no narrator. In this sense, language joins them, mediates between them, and 
allows for the possibilities of invention. 
Coover writes that 
"great narratives remain meaningful through time 
as a 
language-medium between generations ... 
" 
(P & D, 78) and that Cervantes 
created a 
"synthesis between poetic analogy and literal history (not to mention 
reality and illusion, sanity and madness, the erotic and the ludicrous, the 
visionary and the scatological)... 
" 
(P & D, 77). In both cases, fiction mediates 
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between two closely related realms and essentially creates a third. As the third 
realm, the realm of language-medium, fictions 
are self-contained but not 
abstract, fixed, or transcendent. Rather, they incorporate within them the 
imaginative reality of continuous process. 
Furthermore, as I have suggested before, the possibilities implied by inven 
tion do not suggest a total randomness. The imagination discovers both what 
is and is not there, both absence and presence. The lack of any divine causation, 
hyperstatic ideal, 
or even authoritative narrator allows for 
repetitions, varia 
tions, and creativity within certain parameters. If at the outset of "The Magic 
Poker" the narrator asserts that he 
"impose[s] a hot midday silence, a profound 
and heavy stillness," he also acknowledges that "anything can happen" (P & 
D, 20). As a result, the narrator self-consciously enters the same field of 
imagination where the characters and images dwell. The wrought-iron poker 
he places in the grass does not remain in the grass, nor does it stay an iron 
poker. It changes into a prince, into an instrument of destruction, into the 
narrator, and it even links sexual activity to writing. But, as an object, it 
remains more or less constant, for its magic lies in the revelation of attitudes 
toward it. The narrator places it in the grass and lets the story revolve around 
it, and the story becomes all the meanings accrued. Any attempt to single one 
out or the comparable attempt to isolate a specific plot line violates the complex 
nature of response, itself the "meaning" of the story. 
As an analogy for fiction, the magic poker represents the need for imagina 
tive life. It gives rise to our legends, our interpretations, and our plotting of 
reality, but it must never become static. Thus, a legend herself, the grandmoth 
er figure tells the legend of the poker. The poker contains legendary qualities, 
and the legend always contains alternatives within its form. Any single inter 
pretation of it implies stasis. In this sense, Coover clearly emphasizes the 
destructive capacity of fictions or rituals which have lost their connection to 
human response. For example, the common-sensical king appearing in 
one 
episode of "The Magic Poker" points out that the prince who slays a monster 
to rescue a princess merely widows her. Strict adherence to the "desolation of 
artifact" (P & D, 28) and to empty forms represents but needless loss. Thus, 
the recurrent smashing of the green piano in this story does not suggest a 
wanton act of violence as much as the introduction of a less effete, controlled, 
and intellectualized posture in the aesthetic design. At the same time, the 
design remains aesthetic and does not confuse art and life. By including bathos 
and burlesque in it, Coover deploys the "language-medium" to create humor; 
laughter exposes our need for fictions as well as their potential absurdity. 
Moreover, the work of art itself corresponds in "The Magic Poker" to the 
island, invented by the narrator and yet "taking its place in world geography" 
(P & D, 40). It is a place mediated by the world of activity?"I look on a map: 
yes, there's Jackfish Island" (P & D, 40)?in concert with the mediation of 
imagination?"Who invented the map? Well, I must have surely. And the 
Dahlbergs, too, of course, and the people who told me about them. Yes, and 
perhaps tomorrow I will invent Chicago and Jesus Christ and the history of 
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the moon" (P & D, 40). It is a place where the reality of the imagination runs 
untamed, "naked in the brambly fringe of the forest" (P & D, 21), and undoes 
the artifice of logical order. It is a place inhabited by the imagination, a place 
inseparable from 
our 
approach and departure. Having been there, 
we as reader, 
like the characters exploring it, inscribe part of ourselves in its landscape and 
recognize the inscription as a matter of choice. 
Once upon a time there was an island visited by ruin and inhabited by 
strange woodland creatures. Some thought it had once had a caretaker who 
had either died or found another job elsewhere. Others said, no, there was 
never a caretaker, that was only a childish legend. Others believed there 
was indeed a caretaker and he lived there yet and was in fact responsible 
for the island's tragic condition. All this is neither here nor there. 
(P & D, 41) 
Another metaphor for the place of imagination?neither her nor there?ap 
pears in The Universal Baseball Association. Creative renewal ocurs on the playing 
field. In this novel, Coover suggests that realms of the actual and of the 
imagination interpenetrate but must remain autonomous 
as well. For Coover, 
life bears on our fictions and fictions bear on our lives. The interdependence 
of imagination and actuality, however, 
assumes their 
separation. One realm 
must not be totally submerged by the other. Henry Waugh submerges himself 
so 
completely in his fiction that he not only becomes lost to life, but his 
invention fails him as well. We need our fictions to cope with life, and we 
need experience to keep our fictions vital. Coover comments that 
because individual human existence is so brief, in part because each single 
instant of the world is so impossibly complex, we cannot accumulate all 
the data needed for a 
complete, objective statement . . . And so we fabri 
cate; we invent constellations that permit an illusion of order to enable 
us to get from here to there. And we devise short cuts?ways of thinking 
without thinking through: code words that are in themselves a form of 
mythopoeia.4 
The fictions which constitute living cannot change or deny the brevity of 
human existence or the incomplete nature of all knowledge. Yet, these fictions 
unite us in a common 
struggle for something 
more than mere survival and 
less than rigid absolutes. 
Henry Waugh creates a game in which perfection is attainable. He creates 
this baseball game, played at night after work, in order to "kill time." A 
fifty-six year old accountant by day, Henry approaches his own aging with 
growing apprehension. In his game, then, he makes contact with the possibility 
of immortality and perfection through the incredible pitching career of the 
young Damon Rutherford. Damon, rookie pitcher of Henry's imagination, 
can achieve the perfection of absolute 
zero?a no-hit game. 
However, Henry's game depends on chance although Henry himself has 
created it. The dice ultimately determine the fates of the players, and according 
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to Henry, "You can take history or leave it, but if you take it you have to accept 
certain 
assumptions or ground rules 
. . . 
"5 
Accepting these, Henry must also 
accept the throw of the dice which calls for Damon's death and learn that 





a close moment, a static fact, but process, 
yes, and the process was transformation ..." (UBA, 212). 
Thus, the baseball game signifies the life of the imagination, a life whose 
beginnings 
are obscure because they depend 
on ritual re-enactment, transfor 
mations, and motion. As such, art suggests an unclosed circuit: 
. . . 
[t]he circuit wasn't closed, his 
or 
any other: there were patterns, but 
they were shifting and ambiguous and you had a lot of room inside them. 
Secondly, the game on his table was not a message, but an event: the only 
signs he had 
were his own reactions . . . 
(UBA, 143) 
The novel ends as preparations begin for the annual rookie initiation cere 
mony, which includes the ritualistic re-enactment of Damon Rutherford's 
death. Damon had renewed Henry's flagging enthusiasm for his game, but 
Damon's death brought Henry to such despair that he interfered with the rules 
of the game and "killed" the pitcher "responsible" for Damon's death. By the 
last chapter of the novel, Henry has been absorbed by his own invention. In 
effect, he has "killed" himself, and yet the game proceeds without him. 
As Paul Trench, the player about to enact the role of Damon's "Avenger," 
approaches the mound, he mulls over the meaning of this Damonsday, over 
his own participation in it, and over the meaning of life, or the game, itself. 
He prepares to play the part of "history's" survivor: 
Beyond each game, he sees another, and yet another, in endless and 
hopeless succession 
. . . What difference, in the terror of eternity, does it 
make? He stares at the sky, overwhelming in its enormity. He, Paul 
Trench, is utterly absorbed in it, entirely disappears, is Paul Trench no 
longer, is nothing at all: so why does he walk up there? Why does he 
swing? . . . Why is it better to win than to lose? Each day: the 
dread ... He wants to quit?but what does he mean, "quit?" The game? 
Life? Could you separate them? 
(UBA, 238) 
He recounts the various attempts he has made to discover some kind of 
meaning, some rationale. First, he identified with Damon but when he realized 
that Damon's tragedy gave him morbid pleasure, he could not sustain the 
comparison. Then, he tried identifying with Jock Casey, Damon's "killer," 




enjoying that seemed wrong, a creature of false pride? (UBA, 239). Barney 
Bancroft, one of the characters most linked to Waugh himself, merely taught 
Trench "the final 
emptiness 
. . . Bancroft went on, but gave no reasons. And 
wasn't that, finally, a kind of cowardice?" (UBA, 238). In fact, Bancroft's death 
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raises questions about Henry's 
own disappearance, for 
no one knows whether 
Bancroft had been murdered, had committeed suicide, or whether his death 
just happened. Weirdly, independently, meaninglessly. Another accident 
in a chain of accidents: worse even than invention. Invention . . . implies 
a need and need implies purpose; accident implies nothing . . . 
(UBA, 224-225) 
Since, however, history "can never prove a thing" (UBA, 224), one player 
concludes that Bancroft, in all likelihood, was shot by a poet. 
Trench then faces a world devoid of any ascertainable causality or even 
meaning. Consequently, he can find no consoling design in society or history. 
Without any rationale for survival or duty, he finds little purpose in "[c] 
ontinuance for its own inscrutable sake ..." (UBA, 239). Thus, Trench be 
comes 
... a 
willing accomplice to all heresies, but ultimately a partisan of 
none . . . 
... his mockery encapsulates him, cuts him off from any sense of wonder 
or mystery, makes life nothing more than getting by with the least pain 
possible, and somehow to Paul Trench, such a life seems less than human. 
(UBA, 240) 
Therefore, Trench considers a fundamentally idealist position, a position 
which he also rejects. 
Casey, in his writings, has spoken of a 'rising above the rules,' an abandon 
ment of all conceptualizations, including scorekeepers, umpires, Gods in 
any dress, in the heat of total mystic immersion in that essence that 
includes God and his equally. Of course, some say he never wrote it, it's 
all 
apocryphal 
. . . distorted by redactions without number, but no matter, 
the idea itself remains. What it leads to, though, is inaction, a terrible 
passivity. 
(UBA, 240) 
Having found no organizing priniciple of truth, Trench prepares to participate 
in the ritual, regardless. As he approaches the mound, he approaches silent 
ly?" he can find no words" (UBA, 242). Yet, the figure playing Damon, now 
Damon, also reflected on the meaning of Damonsday; it is he who will provide 
Trench with the only adequate response. He tells Trench not to be afraid. 
Trench can now enter the game fully. He no longer cares about factions or 
identities, for no one meaning suffices. There are no sustaining or immutable 
and knowable truths. The self is diverse, not primal. Although they cannot 
provide final cause or purpose, history and society do exist. And, most impor 
tant, time consists of endless beginnings, re-enactments, repetitions, and 
cre 
ative renewal, for time is lived and shared experience. 
With Paul Trench, we are restored to life by means of our fictions, and we 
prepare to act together within the "game," 
not above it. 
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prepare to act together within the "game," 
not above it. 
... it's all irrelevant, it doesn't even matter that he's going to die, all that 
counts is that he is here, and here's The Man and here's the boys and 
there's the crowd, the sun, the noise. 
'It's not a trial,' says Damon, glove tucked in his armpit, hands working 
the new ball. Behind him, he knows, Scat Batkin, the batter, is moving 
toward the plate. 'It's not even the lesson. It's just what it is.' Damon holds 
the baseball up between them. It is hard and white and alive in the sun. 
He laughs. It's beautiful, that ball. He punches Damon lightly in the 
ribs with his mitt. 
'Hang loose,' he says, and pulling down his mask, trots 
back behind home plate. 
(UBA, 242) 
Satisfied at last, Trench moves toward home plate. Home plate is a fiction, and 
knowing this, the Coover character and the Coover reader can replace the mask 
of necessary illusion. After all, the baseball is hard and white and alive in the 
sun. 
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